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Abstract 
The main aim of this thesis is to identify the main environment in which clientelism thrives in 
Indonesia. The environments selected were urban and rural divisions, poverty and 
economically undiversified areas. Throughout the literature read on this topic, many authors 
point to these three factors as determinants of clientelism. With the help of Ward Berenschot, 
from the Royal Institute for Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV), and his Expert 
Survey on Clientelism in Indonesia, I was able to statistically support whether certain 
environments favour clientelism compared to others.  
 The key findings from this thesis was that in Indonesia, based on statistical evidence, 
there is one of the three factors which increases the likeliness of clientelistic practices to take 
place. Both urban and rural divisions and poverty did not have positive findings statistically. 
There was no significant correlation to suggest that these factors played a large role in the 
determining of political clientelism in Indonesia. The only factor which did yield positive 
results was the economic environment of the region. The pattern, as the thesis will 
demonstrate, tended to be that the more economically diversified a region, the less 
clientelistic practices it had. The reasons as to why centre around the fact that economic 
diversity is healthy for a region, as it does not allow for a single actor to set the informal rules 
and practices. Despite quantitative analysis, this thesis also discusses the effects clientelism 
holds over Indonesian political life.  
 Through the combination of quantitative and qualitative sources, this thesis effectively 
compares and contrasts literature to statistical findings. Therefore, I effectively can come up 
with independent opinions that are derived from these two sets of sources, and am able to 
support and contribute to authors which blame economic practices for clientelism.   
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I. Introduction  
As the rest is catching up to the West, many predicted that its archaic forms of societal 
organization would disappear as well. This is most famously conveyed in Francis Fukuyama’s 
Book The End of History and the Last Man. Essentially it predicted that the world would 
assimilate and model itself based on the western liberal democratic model. Instead, what we 
see today is hybridization in the place of homogenization. Hybridization in the sense that 
many non-Western countries have adopted values and ideas of Western political organization 
however; this has been met with locally embedded political prerogatives. The aim of this 
thesis is to explore an aspect of that so called hybridization, through examining patron-client 
relations, especially in the context of vote buying in Indonesia, and how such a traditional 
practice has merged and managed to survive with the rise of democracy. More specifically 
this thesis will aim to discover the extent to which population density, poverty and economic 
diversity affect the prevalence of clientelism in Indonesia. The rationale behind choosing 
these three factors came after analysing literature, which frequently mentioned these factors in 
relation to clientelism. These factors were claimed to be important elements in the thriving of 
clientelism. Furthermore, another reason is to detect which environment clientelism thrives 
the most in. Bearing this in mind I set out to validate these claims, frequently supported by 
secondary sources, and whether they had a role in the prevalence of clientelism in Indonesia.  
 Throughout the thesis, there will be two main concepts which shall be discussed. The 
first is clientelism which according to James C. Scott is “a special case of dyadic ties 
involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic 
status (patron) uses his influence and resource to provide protection or benefits, or both for a 
person of lower status (client) who for his part reciprocates by offering generous support and 
assistance, including personal services to the patron” (Scott 92). My personal interpretation of 
clientelism is that a client is to the patron, like what the taxpayer is to the state. It is services 
(monetary or not) in return for livelihood. For the purposes of this thesis I will create my own 
definition of clientelism, through a synthesis of Scott’s and Hicken’s work. The definition 
goes as follows: A person of high socio-economic status (the patron) who uses his own 
influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both for a person of the same or 
lower status (client) who for his part reciprocates by offering generous support, assistance or 
fulfilling a promise (Scott 92). The second part is that the relationship has to be mutually 
enforcing and has to have elements of power and violence attached to non-compliance 
(Hicken 293-4). 
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 However, clientelism is not the only concept which will be discussed in this thesis. 
Ward Berenschot, working on his post-doctorate at the Royal Institute for Southeast Asian 
and Caribbean Studies (KITLV) has conducted an expert survey throughout Indonesia which 
discusses clientelistic exchange in the context of the 2014 elections which is called: “Expert 
Survey: on Election Campaigns in Indonesia”. Vote buying and clientelism have relative 
close affinity, however there is a distinction to be had, which will be further discussed in the 
theory chapter. According to Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, vote-buying is defined as 
“proffering to voters cash or minor consumption goods by political parties, in office or in 
opposition, in exchange for the recipients vote” (Brusco et al. 67). In addition, Brusco and her 
co-authors consider vote buying to be an intrinsic part of clientelism (67). 
 Due to the contentious discussion surrounding clientelism, the first chapter will 
devoted to creating a clear direction for the remainder of the thesis to be based upon. 
Thereafter, the second chapter will look at if urban and rural cleavages influence the nature of 
clientelism. Once more, the reason behind selecting urban and rural distinctions was that there 
was a high level of questions which implicitly were directed at differentiating the country side 
from the city. Moreover, there were some sociology scholars which pointed to the structural 
weakness of rural areas which would increase the tendency for clientelistic practices. Thus, 
that city spaces were areas which removed themselves from traditional ties, to more formal 
ties. The expected results were that rural settings would be home to much more clientelistic 
practices. Yet statistically this was not the case. Therefore, the third chapter aimed at 
determining whether poverty had an impact on clientelism. There is much supporting 
evidence for this theory, something which Brusco and Stokes comment on widely, and 
Aspinall to a certain extent. Anew, there was no statistical backing in order to consolidate 
such claims in the Indonesia specific case. Due to inconclusive statistical findings, the fourth 
chapter will concern the role of economic diversity and how different economic environments 
create for more or less clientelism. Throughout Indonesian literature on clientelism, a vast 
array of authors discuss the effects that resource intensiveness and lack of diversification bear 
effect on the levels of clientelism in certain areas in Indonesia. These ideas are statistically 
backed with Berenschot’s data, leading to a positive outcome stipulating that certain 
economic activity can increase the levels of clientelistic behaviour. The effects of this are that 
the thesis has discovered that economic activity, instead of urban and rural divisions or 
poverty, bears the greatest influence on clientelistic behaviour in Indonesia. The final section 
of this thesis will look at all three factors and analyse how these three factors have an 
extremely negative impact on the Indonesian political scene today.  
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II. Chapter 1: Theory 
The preliminary research for this topic was largely based around understanding what 
clientelism entails and what are its components. Furthermore, for this thesis a clear 
understanding of clientelism needs to be established. The most influential one for this thesis is 
Allen Hicken and his text “Clientelism”, which is a chronological discussion of how views 
and definitions of clientelism have changed through time. The first definition of clientelism 
was that it was primarily based around a dyadic relationship which is described as an 
instrumental friendship (Hicken 2011: 290). One major proponent of this view is James C. 
Scott, who described this type of relationship in the Southeast Asian context. Scott enforces 
the idea that there needs to be a face-to-face relationship between patron and client which will 
eventually create a level of trust between the pair (Scott 94). Besides individual relationships, 
Scott also goes on to describing how groupings of clientelist networks operate, which is 
through brokers and pyramid structures producing vertical power relations (Scott 96). These 
are all elements which Hicken discusses and associates to earlier writings on clientelism. But 
Scott was quite ahead for his time, despite exploring vertical relations of power, he also 
discusses horizontal relations of power which some authors do not mention in their discussion 
of clientelism. Horizontal clientelist relations are ones which are between people of similar 
socio-economic power (Scott 96). Scott’s and Hicken’s most valuable asset was to provide for 
reference points on how to define clientelism.  
 Despite the clarity and direction both these authors provide, understanding clientelism 
is not that straight forward. For the purpose of the thesis, I will discuss the schism which is 
between the more traditional old school definition of clientelism and the newer, more 
instantaneous version of the definition. In the very traditional sense, clientelism was 
extremely hierarchical, and centred around long standing face-to-face interactions, essentially 
clientelism was seen as an instrumental friendship (Hicken 290). These are views that both 
Hicken and Scott uphold. As mentioned earlier, Scott was quite revolutionary for his time, as 
he already recognized the eroding of the more traditional characteristics of clientelism. He 
stated that modernization has created multiple dependencies, thus there is no longer a strong 
need, hence a strong relation to the single patron one used to have prior to modernization 
(Scott 107). In addition to this, Daniel Arghiros not only blames modernity for causing the 
change in what constitutes clientelism, but also the scholars using the term. Arghiros makes 
the compelling case that today, many political scientists use the term clientelism to describe 
the relationship that would orthodoxly not fall under the term clientelism (7). According to 
him, “relations between politicians and their subordinate political campaigners, canvassers or 
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vote brokers do not often amount to multifaceted, dyadic relationships of patron-clientage” 
(Arghiros 8). Such a debate has equally strong arguments on both sides as to why the 
definition of clientelism should allow for flexibility and leniency or not. Based on what I have 
read for the thesis, I will side with the fact that clientelism can include vote-buying and adopt 
a wider and more flexible definition. I have made this assumption based on two strong 
notions. The first is that modernity has changed the face of clientelism, as Scott stipulates, 
single dependencies no longer exist on such a wide scale, thus there is a need for a new more 
flexible view of clientelism which has adapted itself to its current context. The second is that 
the ability to punish is intrinsic to clientelism and vote buying, especially when the counter 
party (either the patron or the client) defects on his or her part (Hicken 293). With this in 
mind it answers the question if vote-buying can be considered clientelism, and based on 
personal interpretation it can, due to the fact that punishment and exclusion are still possible 
with vote-buying.  
III. Chapter 2: Urban and Rural Divisions 
In contemporary academic literature, there are only few authors which discuss the influence 
urban or rural areas have on political behaviour, especially in the Indonesia specific context. 
Nevertheless, the survey made by researcher, Ward Berenschot, poses many questions to the 
interviewees to compare clientelism in the city and the country side. These two factors were 
what drove me to analyse the division in clientelism between urban and rural patterns of 
clientelism. This chapter will then aim to denote whether sociological patterns of organization 
greatly influence the prevalence of clientelism in urban and rural areas. With this I mean to 
test whether urban spaces have developed in contrast to rural spaces, whether they have 
moved beyond traditional and cultural informal ties in cities in contrast to rural spaces. The 
last reason to undertake this as a method of analysis was due to the fact that a more general 
division, as the one mentioned, would provide a good platform from which to create more 
specific divisions in order to detect whether there are other factors at play which greatly 
influence clientelism and vote buying.  
 On the whole, people like to analyse and denote the differences in general behaviour 
between people from cities and from the country-side. These behavioural differences are not 
just confined to the banal activities, but also stretch out to the realms of politics, economics, 
and conceptions about the environment. In general people from cities put forth different 
values than people hailing from rural areas. Interactions in cities are largely influenced by the 
fact that cities have very dense populations, thus making the exchange of information easier. 
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Moreover, cities are usually more developed infrastructure wise. There is much more 
transportation making it easier to get to the surrounding areas, thus broadening the horizons of 
its inhabitants. Another factor which influences city dwellers, especially politically, is that 
cities are usually the hubs of the country’s political economy. Due to this context, political 
decisions matter a great deal to the inhabitants, coupled with the fact that cities are also the 
home to much of the media that spread information at much greater intensity with many 
varying kinds of opinions all concentrated in smaller space. Logically speaking this divide 
would be even bigger in countries that have not yet fully modernized economically and 
politically. The reasons for this, is due to the fact that lesser developed countries are lacking 
in infrastructure, thus there is not as great of a connection between the urban and the rural. 
Not only do I speak in terms of transportation, but also in terms of media and communication 
forms. Typically in developing countries, it is a known fact that there is less internet access 
and media coverage in the country side. The last major factor, based on my own intuition, 
which divides rural and urban modes of living, is the ability for anonymity in a city compared 
to the country side. When applying this notion to clientelism, one would expect anonymity to 
be a constraint to clientelistic practices. This claim is made due to the fact that an increase in 
population density allows for individuals to become anonymous and thus make sure they are 
less observed than in rural settings, where informal ties matter much more. Considering this, 
the expected results are that in Indonesia rural and urban cleavages matter greatly in the 
differing levels of clientelism in Indonesia. This is reflected by my research hypothesis for 
this section was that rural areas would have higher values in clientelism. My starting point 
was to look at section B and parts of A of the “Expert Survey: on Election Campaigns in 
Indonesia” done by Berenschot. The reason for this was that Section B centres on the action 
of the voter and the influences he or she faces when voting. The first test I ran was to 
understand how wide-spread vote-buying was. To visualize this, I took question A6 which 
was: “how common is the practice of handing out money or consumer goods to attract votes 
in your district” (Berenschot “Expert Survey”)?  The graph below demonstrates the different 
between Urban and Rural, denoted as City and District. The division between city and district 
is based on how the Indonesian government categorizes both of them. Cities go under the 
name of Kota and district Kabupaten. 
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Graph 2.1: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey”) 
 
Excluding presidential elections, the overall trend demonstrates that, a perceived average of 
60% of voters across Indonesia obtain money or consumer goods when voting for different 
kinds of elections. Thus the hypothesis that vote-buying is common practice in Indonesia is 
validated, however this is almost non-refutable. The hypothesis I was after is not validated in 
this test. The differences between city and district are so minimal that they are insignificant, 
thus showing that there is no general trend which divides urban and rural.  
 Another result that this graph demonstrates which raises curiosity is that District-level 
Legislative Assembly has almost 60-80% of voters which receive money before they vote. 
This level stands far out of the norm compared to the other 3 types of elections. The reason 
for this is quite simple. It is due to the fact that legislative assembly elections are extremely 
contested. On aggregate, thus combining all cities (Kota) and districts (Kabupaten), there are 
19,699 seats contested (Aspinall 2014 98). However, for each those 20,000 seats, there were 
180,000 candidates in the 2014 elections (Aspinall 2014 98). The sheer amount of candidates 
for comparatively few seats provides all the more reason for each candidate to hand out 
money prior to the election. Furthermore, in resource rich area for district legislative assembly 
elections, it is normal to see as much as $15 to be handed out for that particular election type 
(Aspinall 2014 106). Comparatively in many parts of Indonesia, $3 for all three election 
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types: district/mayoral, governor and legislative assembly elections is the norm (Aspinall 
2014 106).   
 Aspinall states that such tactics are common in Indonesia, and are seen as part of 
“Indonesia’s gift-based public culture” (Aspinall 2014 106). It is a widely known 
phenomenon that vote-buying is intrinsic to Indonesia, and is extremely successful compared 
to other areas of the world, especially western countries. According to David Henley this is 
due to local ethical reasons, it is a duty to repay a gift (Henley 2014). Not only do ethical 
reasons enforce a sense of duty, but for Indonesians, the use of money during campaigns 
show that candidates are serious about their ambitions (Aspinall 2014 108). The following 
graph puts these notions to test in order to see whether there is reciprocity from the recipients 
part. 
Graph 2.2: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey”) 
 
The graph above is based on question C1 from the questionnaire which asks: “please assess 
how effective politicians are in their efforts to mobilize voters by offering money or consumer 
goods”? (Berenschot “Expert Survey”).On the overall level we note that there is a sense that 
vote-buying does strengthen the compliance the recipient feels, and does create a certain level 
of effectiveness. Once more, there are no major differences between urban and rural 
cleavages. Another similarity between graph 2.1 and 2.2 is that the high amount of money 
given for legislative assembly elections also represents high amount of obligation held by the 
recipients. Therefore, a correlation can be found that with money handed out, results in an 
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increased propensity for the recipient to reciprocate by voting for that candidate. More 
importantly, the district population is more likely to feel obliged to vote. This reflects 
Aspinall’s conclusion that more remote resource rich areas tend to give more money for 
legislative elections. Yet, the influence of resources on clientelism and vote-buying will be 
discussed in chapter 4.  
 
Yet, the graphs above might not fully demonstrate the divides in Indonesia between urban and 
rural. The Indonesian state is set up with multiple levels of governance, there is the national, 
provincial and regency/district (Kabupaten) and City (Kota) as the final subdivision. 
However, these divisions are quite arbitrary, as they do not precisely represent the words that 
label them. In many districts there are still some highly urbanized and industrialized areas. 
With this in mind, another way of dividing urban and rural special areas was created. The 
subsequent graph is the same as graph 1.2, but compares the two different modes of dividing 
urban and rural.  
Table 2.1: (Source: Berenschot: “Expert Survey”) 
  City District Urban Rural 
District Head/Mayoral Election 2,98 3,46 3,12 3,39 
Governor Election 2,92 2,89 2,99 2,82 
Legislative Assembly Elections 3,6 3,98 3,7 3,94 
Presidential Elections 2,13 2,14 2,13 2,13 
 
Graph2.3: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey”)
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The new classification: Urban and Rural, was based on how much of the GDP was based on 
agricultural revenue. This data was acquired from Ward Berenschot’s “District Statistics”. 
The thresh hold was at 20%, but it has to be said that few districts or cities were at the 20% 
mark, either far below or above it. Thus, below 20% constituted an urban location and above 
was classified as rural. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, any moment that urban and 
rural is used in a graph, it will be based on the same criteria, unless stated otherwise. As the 
graph and table demonstrate, this changed very little in the outcome of how effective money 
was in persuading voters to vote for a certain candidate. In fact, when one takes a look at the 
exact numbers, the new division brought less difference between urban and rural than there 
exists between city and district. Another point of interest that this latest graph raises, is that 
both forms of division demonstrate an equal level of effectiveness in two types of elections, 
the legislative and presidential. Once more, this confirms Aspinall’s hypothesis, that these 
elections are so hotly contested, thus they create for more pervasive tactics during the election 
campaign. In addition it also confirms the fact that, Indonesians see the use of money in an 
election as the level of commitment by a certain candidate, and this is also seen in the tables, 
the more money given results in its effectiveness (Aspinall 2014 108). Nonetheless, this still 
leaves the question, as to why the presidential elections have such low vote-buying and 
effectiveness. Does this mean that there is generally less of a need to repay the debt during the 
presidential elections? I believe this to be down to the fact that the presidential election is the 
one which is the furthest removed from the people. By this I mean that unlike the 
Mayoral/District head, governor or legislative elections, less people are affected by the 
presidential elections on daily basis. In addition, there is less of the social control factor at 
play during presidential elections. Like in every country, there is a distance felt between the 
nation-state’s head and the voter. Any Indonesian voter has more anonymity during a 
presidential election, as there 240 million other voters voting for that same election. Whilst 
that distance is reduced between the mayor and the voter, simply due to the geographical and 
numerical factors limiting the election. Taking this into account there might also be more 
pressure on the money recipient to repay the favour as there might be more of the candidates 
tim sukses present due to the fact that these agents have less territory to cover, meaning that 
they can keep tighter control on their constituents, consequently heightening the incentive to 
repay one’s debt. Moreover, there is less impetus for predatory interests at the presidential 
level, due to the decentralized nature of Indonesia, meaning that more of these interests get 
contested at the provincial or city/district level. These are the personal interpretations of why 
presidential elections do not involve as much vote-buying. On the other hand, Mujani and 
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Liddle draw a different conclusion. They state that over recent years, Indonesian voters have 
become more rational, really focusing and setting “standards for individual leaders such as: 
personal integrity, social empathy, professional competence” (Mujani & Liddle 91). Hence 
the data demonstrates that money does play a role in presidential elections, nonetheless, there 
are other factors, such as personal integrity, which play large roles in the individual’s decision 
making.  
  
Simply looking at C1 does not shed enough light if the alternative classification between 
urban and rural does provide any sound conclusions. Therefore, the next graph will look at 
other questions of the survey which have a stronger emphasis on the “purer” form of 
clientelism. These indicators really centre around punishment.  
Graph 2.4: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey” & “District Statistics”) 
 
Graph 2.4 measures the frequency of welfare programmes distributed during election 
campaigns. The question goes as follows: “in your estimation, when implementing welfare 
programmes (handouts of cash, rice, or subsidize healthcare) after elections, how often do 
these local government representatives prioritize the people who voted for their preferred 
candidate” (Berenschot “Expert Survey”). In the introductory paragraph of chapter 2, the 
expected results would be that social control in villages and the lack of state infrastructure 
would facilitate and encourage candidates to employ such tactics of gaining popularity and 
votes. This was expected to be especially the case with question A3a, as it specifically targets 
the question of lack of infrastructure, because typically districts and less urbanized areas tend 
to lack healthcare and grand mechanized ways of distributing the necessities for living. In 
contrast, the cities are usually the metropolises of nation-states, thus those basic infrastructure 
elements are usually present there. Joel D. Barkan who wrote “Elections in Agrarian 
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Societies” directly supports this argument, and furthers it by stating that during elections 
“they (people from agrarian societies) focus on the basic needs of their community… whether 
they have adequate water, schools, health-care facilities” (107). In addition, question A3a also 
addresses the role that social control and population plays in elections in urban versus rural 
societies. Typically, agricultural societies are less densely populated than urban ones thus 
there a greater tendency to have closer and personal relations with a greater amount of people. 
Furthermore, this facilitates the task at hand for clientelistic organizations when running rice 
handouts or other political patronage tactics. Despite these anticipated conclusions this is not 
the case that is shown by the quantitative data. In fact, when taking the agricultural mode of 
defining urban and rural, there is a greater similarity between the two. The discussion as to 
possible reasons why there is no disparity will be relegated to the conclusion this chapter.  
Graph 2.5: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey”) 
 
Similar results were expected with graph 2.5. The question which was quantified in this graph 
was A8a: In your estimation, of all the major contracts that the district government awards, 
how many go to companies or businessmen that have supported election campaigns of the 
ruling politicians” (Berenschot “Expert Survey”). In general the result is quite astounding, 
where at least 60-80% of the government contracts are given to business men which 
supported the winning candidate in the 2014 elections. In the more rural areas (classified as 
district/rural) one does note a slightly higher value for contracts given. Nonetheless, the fact 
that on average 60-80% of the contracts are given to supporters is quite shocking. Moreover, 
this is quite a worrying situation for Indonesian democracy, as it shows that meritocratic 
values are not upheld. Thus the contract for building a certain road does not go to the “best” 
company, instead to the one with the most avid supporting campaign. This should not be seen 
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as a temporary phase states Hadiz, instead he ties such practices to the notion of gift-giving 
culture in Indonesia, claiming that money politics is “fundamentally inherent to the logic of 
power relations that define an illiberal form of democracy already consolidated and 
entrenched” (Hadiz & Robinson 231).  
 Another point of worry that is brought up through this graph is that it demonstrates the 
lack of acknowledgement or perhaps respect for the existing formal procedures that any given 
entrepreneur needs to follow in order to get the contract awarded. Following the argument 
concerning infrastructure, it could have been argued that rural areas were more prone to 
“backroom deals” and informal manners of granting and obtaining contracts. Essentially, 
there are three main types of characteristics that make up rural social relations. They are very 
intense, durable and have frequent occurrence, they are conduits for exchange of more than 
one social resource and based on kinship, rural solidarity rather than on personal friendship 
(Beggs et al. 309). Sociological studies would then support the idea such intense rural 
personal relations would be a breeding ground for patronage to thrive in. Therefore, many saw 
clientelism as a pre-modern form of society, and modernization would lead to official and 
established forms of governing which would erase such relations. However, Indonesia has 
proved the contrary, perhaps demonstrating that such personal ties are still essential to daily 
life in Indonesia. The last graph of this chapter demonstrates exactly that.  
Graph 2.6: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey”). 
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The questioned posed was B1: How strong is the capacity of the following organizations and 
individuals to influence voters in your district during elections for bupati (district head) or 
walikota (mayor). The graph shows again that there is no divide between city and district, yet 
what is most surprising is the relatively strong amount of influence that religious leaders and 
local state officials still hold. Another key difference that this highlights, is that in other parts 
of the world apart from Western Europe, religion has not been effaced with the rise of 
modernism and rationality. Once more, it also demonstrates the intrinsic value of personal 
ties, especially to people of status, thus also enforcing the notion that due to the survival of 
such relations, it has also been possible for clientelism to survive in Indonesia.  
 
The six graphs and 1 table in this chapter altogether undermine the original hypothesis, which 
was that urban and rural areas would have great differences in the levels of clientelistic 
practices. As mentioned throughout this chapter, the reasoning behind this was that village 
and rural life allows for more personal relations, facilitating clientelistic exchanges. On top of 
that, the lack of infrastructure in these two distinct areas would also enable clientelism to 
flourish in areas with little effective infrastructure. What seems to have prevailed in Indonesia 
is economic and political development, yet this has not resulted in the disappearance of 
traditional modes of social organization, such as for example the culture of gift giving. 
Nonetheless, this does not answer the question as to why there is no dissonance between 
urban and rural levels of clientelism. There is however one author who addresses this 
phenomenon. Terence McGee, in his co-edited book, The Extended Metopolis: Settlement 
Transition in Asia discusses the spatial organization between cities and rural areas in Asia. He 
explains this phenomenon through describing the average “Asian region” which he labels as a 
Desakota, Indonesian for town (kota) and village (desa) (McGee 7). The inspiration for such a 
name comes from Indonesia. These desakota’s are, “regions with an intense mixture of 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities that often stretch along corridors between large city 
cores” (McGee 7). Besides those characteristics, other characteristics such as rising household 
income, improved transportation linkages and improved infrastructures are what characterize 
Indonesia, especially Java (McGee 8). The attributes of the desakota demonstrate how Asian 
regions, especially Indonesian ones have synthesized their country side and urban living 
modes. Through high population density, improving infrastructure, increased communication 
levels, there are no longer any barriers between city and village life. This then explains the 
reason why the data did not demonstrate enormous differences in urban and rural levels of 
clientelism, as Indonesia is a very densely populated country, with little cleavages between 
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city and village modes of living. As a result, we can state that such proximity of urban and 
rural living has resulted in the overall upholding and widespread prevalence of informal 
political ties and modes of organization. Moreover, these widespread informal ties are not 
more concentrated in cities than in rural areas. As a result, the hypothesis that rural and urban 
divisions are determinants of clientelism can be negated. On the other hand, this chapter does 
not aid in shedding light on certain environments where clientelism thrives.  
 
IV. Chapter 3: Poverty 
Due to such inconclusive results in urban and rural determinants of clientelism, I will now test 
whether poverty plays a role in the prevalence of clientelistic behaviour. The research 
hypothesis for chapter 3 will be that poverty bears great influence on clientelism and vote-
buying. This section will go more into depth on the vote-buying side of clientelism. This is a 
view mainly upheld by Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes. In their text, they use quantitative 
information to determine whether poverty influences a person’s susceptibility to vote buying 
or not. Despite this being discussed in the Argentinian context, the findings from Brusco and 
her co-authors state that 1 in 4 poor people claim that campaign handouts influenced their 
voting behaviour (Brusco et al. 69). The primary explanation given as to why poor people are 
inclined to be influenced by vote buying propositions, is that a poorer person has more utility 
to a “campaign package” than a rich person (Brusco et al. 72). This is a view which is shared 
by Hicken, when stating that the poor tend to be more risk averse, thus meaning that they are 
more likely to think about the immediate future instead of the long term, meaning that they 
easily fall into vote-buying mechanisms (299). These are two authors that comment on the 
nature of poverty and their risk averseness in relation to clientelism. The only qualitative 
evidence that exists which depicts a similar picture is in Aspinall’s “Indonesia’s 2014 
Elections: Parliament and Patronage”. In this text Aspinall states that ordinary Indonesians 
see the election time as a way for them to supplement their incomes (2014 108). With these 
qualitative statements there seems to be enough evidence supporting the argument that 
poverty has influential attributes in relation to clientelism.   
 When correlating poverty (amount of population below the poverty in 2012) and 
question C1a, we find there to be dissonance between the quantitative and qualitative research 
done. C1a asks to assess the effectiveness of vote-buying was in their district or mayoral 
elections (Berenschot “Expert Survey”).  
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Table 3.1: (Source: Berenschot “District Statistics” and “Expert Survey”) 
Correlations 
 C1a Poverty 
C1a Pearson 
Correlation 
1 ,201 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,220 
N 39 39 
Poverty Pearson 
Correlation 
,201 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,220  
N 39 39 
The table shows us that there is no significance to this data, seeing as the significance result is 
far above 0.05. As a result, the research hypothesis cannot be accepted, which means that 
there is no relation between poverty and the effectiveness of vote-buying in Indonesia. The 
alternate hypothesis is strengthened when looking at the following table.  
Table 3.2: (Source: Berenschot “District Statistics” and “Expert Survey”) 
Location Name C1a 
% of Population Below 
Poverty 
Karawang 4,15 11,1 
Minahasa Selatan 4,14 8,61 
Kutai Kartanegara 4,08 6,94 
Jayawijaya 4,08 39,04 
Bulungan 4,08 11,73 
Table 4.2 depicts the fact that both poor regions and less poor regions make up the top 5 areas 
with the highest values for effectiveness of vote-buying. Thus it cannot be said with full 
confidence that Stokes’ hypothesis holds true in Indonesia. A causal factor for this is that 
Indonesia has had a strong history of development. This has been present throughout 
Suharto’s reign, as a way to deter poorer members of society to swing towards the communist 
threat. As a result, Indonesia invested quite large sums of money in developing its 
infrastructure and outer islands, in an effort to alleviate people from poverty. Such a trend has 
continued since the fall of Suharto, which is shown by the fact that Indonesia has one of the 
fastest growing middle classes in Southeast Asia (IFAD). Moreover, it has been able to reduce 
poverty from 17% in 2004 to 11% in 2014 (IFAD). Nonetheless, it is not just the poverty 
reduction that has acted against poor people’s susceptibility to clientelism and vote-buying. 
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Instead, it’s the widespread and deeply engrained nature of such practices throughout 
Indonesia. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, in order to be taken as a serious candidate in 
Indonesian political life, one needs to be active in the culture of gift-giving (Aspinall 2014 
107). Moreover, such a cultural norm is so deeply engrained in Indonesia, that even activists 
which speak out against corruption and clientelism still use tactics that might be seen as vote-
buying and clientelism (Aspinall 2014 105). The only difference is that they will use 
strategies that are considered as communitarian development instead of individual vote-
buying (Aspinall 2014 105). Consequently the deeply widespread phenomenon of vote-
buying and clientelism is not something that is isolated and allocated to disfavoured areas of 
Indonesia. Instead it takes on a more global scope, reducing the influence poverty has over 
clientelistic behaviour. In turn, this means that now the second research hypothesis, that 
poverty increases the propensity for clientelistic practices to occur has been statistically 
negated in the Indonesian context.  
 
V. Chapter 4: Economic Diversity 
The last major factor which is discussed in much of the literature on clientelism, is economic 
characteristics and its effect on the matter. What such literature claims is that the neo-liberal 
and decentralized state that Indonesia finds itself as one of the main causes for the persistence 
of clientelism in a democratic Indonesia. The main reason that most scholars rally around is 
the idea that during Suharto’s time period there was a centralized state which created a 
predictable and steady clientelistic state, however today, “neoliberalism and clientelism are 
linked and in some senses mutually enforcing… (they) work to strip Indonesian politics of its 
ideological trappings and reveal the workings economic calculation at its core” (Aspinall 
2013 29). The reason why money has been able to hold such large influence over politics in 
Indonesia today is down to, “poorly developed regulatory institutions, a lack of state capacity, 
or a civil society with inadequate social capital to support markets” (Hadiz & Robinson 221). 
As a result chapter 4 will try to prove the research hypothesis, which claims that economic 
activity, especially undiversified economies are niche’s for clientelism to thrive in.  
 Due to the heavy influence of such theories in texts discussing clientelism in 
Indonesia, the next section will aim at validating such claims that authors make with 
statistical backing. Most importantly, many scholars make reference to the resource curse, 
making claims that resource intensive areas in Indonesia are breeding grounds for predatory 
interests. The fact of the matter is, that decentralization in Indonesia has allowed for predatory 
interests to control public institutions and resources, especially at the local level (Hadiz and 
19 
 
Robinson, 232). By combining the data from the “Expert Survey: on Election Campaigns in 
Indonesia” and data collected by Ward Berenschot on the economic and social composition of 
each district and city, “District Statistics”, I will be able to test whether the claims made by 
authors such as Hadiz, Robinson, Aspinall and others are legitimate, and offer my own 
conclusions on the statistical data.  
 The following table and graph will focus on state dependency and if it plays a role in 
clientelism in Indonesia.  
Table 4.1: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survery” “District Statistics”) 
Correlations 
 
Perc_Govt_E
xp A8a_dis 
Perc_Govt_Ex
p 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 ,404
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,011 
N 39 39 
A8a_dis Pearson 
Correlation 
,404
*
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,011  
N 39 39 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
The table above is taken from the SPSS software and which runs a correlation test. This test is 
to determine whether the first variable, percentage of government expenditure in each district 
or city determines A8a. A8a was a question from the “Expert Survey” which posed the 
question: “In your estimation, of all the major the major contracts that the district government 
awards, how many go to companies or businessmen that have supported the election 
campaigns of ruling politicians during elections” (Berenschot “Expert Survey”)? The level of 
government expenditure in each district was taken from Berenschot’s “District Statistics”. 
Underneath table 3.1, one can notice the note that states that if the significance level is above 
0.05 then the research hypothesis has to be rejected. However, the significance level is 0.01, 
thus the research hypothesis can be accepted, therefore, according to this test the amount of 
government expenditure has a slight influence on the outcome of A8a. However this value is 
not exceptionally high, 0.4 means that there is a weak positive correlation. 
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Graph 4.1: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey” “District Statistics”) 
 
The graph above depicts the weak correlation that exists when plotting these two variables. 
Overall, the graph demonstrates that there is in fact a very high level of contracts which go to 
supporters of political candidates. The lowest figure that was given was just below 3, which is 
between 20-40% of the contracts that go to active supporters of political candidates. This goes 
in accordance with the hypothesis set forth by Blunt, Turner and Lindroth, which states that 
Human Resource Management (HRM), “which is manifested in the purchase of jobs, 
promotions, exam results, transfers and placements… becomes integral to patronage” (Blunt 
et al. 215). On the whole there are few authors who comment on state dependency and its 
influence over clientelism. Despite the lack of qualitative support, intuitively it can be said 
that clientelism flourishes in state dependent areas due to the increased concentration of 
governmental money that runs through certain locations. Furthermore, due to democracy’s 
unconsolidated position in Indonesia, it has been reconstructed to fit the needs of the ruling 
parties in order to facilitate predatory interests (Blunt et al. 219). As a result, areas in 
Indonesia with high state dependency are more likely to be vulnerable to predatory interests 
as political parties and candidates are able to use state resources to benefit their constituents, 
friends, family and supporters. Lastly, the resource curse theory states that resource rich areas 
are more likely to experience corruption and patronage politics (Shaxson 1123). 
Hypothetically, if we took state budgets as a resource, the same would hold true, that 
dependence on one or few resources causes bad governance and patronage. Aspinall applies 
Legend: 
1: None 
2: 0-20% 
3: 20-40% 
4: 40-60% 
5: 60-80% 
6: 80-100% 
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this idea to the Indonesian context. He coins the term as Proyek (meaning the project), which 
is a “self-contained collaborative, and funded activity intended to achieve a designated end” 
but which now is a pattern that permeates through bureaucracy, political actors and 
organizations that clutters around the state (Aspinall 2013 30). Essentially Aspinall depicts 
the state’s pervasive influence in project creation and seeking. Seeing as they are the main 
providers of projects they are the perfect hunting ground for patronage hunters (Aspinall 2013 
30). In turn, this confirms the notion that with an economy that is not heavily diversified and 
the state as a primary actor, it increases the likelihood of clientelistic practices.  
 This hypothesis is further enforced when correlating the level of government 
expenditure as part of the GDP to question A1a. This question looks at how likely it is for the 
population of a village to obtain funding from the government to improve their basic 
amenities if the population did not vote for that candidate (Berenschot). The result is the 
following: 
Table 4.2: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey” “District Statistics”) 
Correlations 
 
Perc_Govt_E
xp A1a 
Perc_Govt_Ex
p 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -,339
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,035 
N 39 39 
A1a Pearson 
Correlation 
-,339
*
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,035  
N 39 39 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
This time there is a quite weak correlation between the two variables, yet the data is 
significant. What this means is that the less people vote for the successful candidate, the less 
likely they are to get basic reparations to facilities such as: roads, electrification, schools etc, 
shown by the -0.3. McMann sets forth the idea that economic independence and autonomy is 
critical in order for democracy to function (4). If it is not the case, an area is too dependent on 
the state, there is a tendency for state interference in private ventures, consequently inhibiting 
democratic practices (4). McMann’s hypothesis is directly reflected in this data analysis, 
which demonstrates that if the state is able to have its way, it results in clientelistic practices 
that are put forth.  
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 In contrast to this, when measuring the level of industrial activity in contrast to the 
same variable, A8a, the other side of the coin comes to light.  
Table 4.3: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey” “District Statistics”) 
Correlations 
 A8a_dis 
Perc_Ind_Gd
p 
A8a_dis Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -,356
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,026 
N 39 39 
Perc_Ind_Gd
p 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-,356
*
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,026  
N 39 40 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Again, what is most important is to confirm whether the findings are statistically significant, 
which in this case it is. As a result, the research hypothesis can be confirmed, meaning that 
industrial activity reduces the level of clientelism, specifically the amount of contracts given 
to supporters of political candidates. Industrial activity refers to the percentage of the areas 
GDP made up by industrial output, as with government expenditure, this data was also found 
on Berenschot’s “District Statistics”. Typically the level of industry is already a move towards 
economic diversity and less dependence on natural resources or on the state as a way to 
sustain livelihood. What this table demonstrates is that there is a weak negative correlation 
between the two variables, thus economic diversity has certain negative influence over 
clientelistic practices. Table 3.4 stands in contrast to table 3.2 and 3.3, despite the weak levels 
of correlation demonstrates, the set of tables denote the effect that economic practices have 
over the levels of clientelism. Once more, if one takes McMann’s ideas into consideration we 
find the same conclusions drawn. Moreover, economic independence (as is the case with 
industry, as it is usually outside of the realm of state control), provides for certain classes with 
the economic resources to stand against the government (McMann 4-5). Conversely, if we 
were to apply this case to an area where much of the population’s budget is derived from the 
state, then they are not equipped with the tools to act against the government.  Intuitively, 
competition between economic sectors allows for healthy governance. This is because not one 
economic sector is able to set all the informal rules and practices within society. 
Hypothetically, if a construction firm owner is looking to supply roads, he will more likely be 
susceptible to engage in clientelistic behaviour if there is one industry or company to supply 
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roads for. Without his engagement in such practices he would lose out in the market to supply 
roads, this is also known as the phenomenon of the tragedy of the commons. However, in an 
economically diverse sector, that firm owner can supply roads to many different industrial 
sectors, thus he is not compelled to engage in clientelistic behaviour.  
 In order to further enforce the argument that undiversified economies create 
clientelism, the case study of Banten will be used to prove this. Syarif Hidayat discusses this 
in detail in his essay “Shadow State?: Business and Politics in the province of Banten”. On 
paper, Banten seems like quite a diversified economy, with 50% of the GDP deriving from 
the processing industry, 17% from the trade, restaurant and hotel sector, and 10% from 
agriculture (Hidayat 207). On the other hand, Banten has many disfavoured areas, which led 
to the Indonesian government injecting 216 billion Rupiah in the region, which, “has become 
one of the main objects of attention from business people in their informal economy 
practices” (Hidayat 207). What this example demonstrates is the ability for even a relatively 
diversified market to become undiversified, through the huge sums of money becoming the 
main target of clientelistic practices. Throughout the chapter, Hidayat only makes Banten 
specific claims, but the general idea obtained, is that when the construction sector provides for 
such lucrative possibilities (financed by the state), combined with a weak decentralized state, 
it creates more incentive for local politicians and business elite to collude and monopolize 
state resources for personal benefit.   
  
Nevertheless, the hypothesis that natural resources influences clientelistic behaviour has yet to 
be verified. The only data available on all the districts and cities in terms of natural resources 
is the percent of GDP that is derived from mining activities. When correlating this data to 
question A11a, When a campaign donor asks for help to get a permit to build a commercial 
building in area officially designated for farming, how likely is it that the District head/Mayor 
will arrange the building permit?” or A8a, inconclusive results are found. In her text: “Elite 
Competition in Central Sulawesi” found in Renegotiating Boundaries: Local politics in post-
Suharto Indonesia, Aragon demonstrates how the use of natural resources are key for political 
rents (39). Furthermore, the creation of new districts throughout Indonesia are key to 
controlling lucrative positions, migration flows, control of construction and so forth (Aragon 
52-53). This idea is reflected in Aspinall’s text “Nation in fragments” stating that when 
Indonesia democratized it had 341 districts. By 2010 the figure stood at 497” (Aspinall 2013 
39). Hence, the creation of new districts presents for many predatory and economic 
opportunities of itself. Coupled with the abundance of natural resources, Aragon explains that 
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new districts are a real playground for patrons and their predatory interests to gain control of 
resource rich areas (61).  Hadiz and Robinson reflect this idea, that for local political actors in 
resource rich regions outside Java, there is immense economic sense for them to break from 
the shackles of central control and monopolize those resources for themselves (235). Aspinall 
pushes this argument further, by synthesizing the notion of decentralized and weak state of 
Indonesia he claims that a gold rush mentality took over with “local politicians, bureaucrats, 
and their allies plundering state budgets, regional assets, and natural resources” (2013 38). 
This demonstrates the abundance of authors that make reference to the notion that natural 
resources are one of the main determinants of clientelistic practices, especially within the 
state’s context. As mentioned earlier, the data shows immense incongruence with the 
qualitative research done.  
Graph 4.2: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey” “District Statistics”) 
 
What the graph reveals is that there is no effect of the level of mining on the amount of 
contracts distributed to close political connections. According to the authors mentioned 
above, the only area that holds true to their hypotheses is Kutai Kartanegara, a district in the 
east of Kalimantan. 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: 
1: Very 
Unlikely 
2: Unlikely 
3: Possible 
4: Likely 
5: Very Likely 
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Table 4.4: (Source: Berenschot “District Statistics” And “Expert Survey”) 
A11a 
Mining as part of 
GDP Location 
4,77 1,78 Kota Kupang 
4,62 0,85 
Kota Bandar 
Lampung 
4,55 1,62 Kota Palangka Raya 
4,54 83,92 Kutai Kartanegara 
4,43 0 Kota Medan 
 
What the table above demonstrates is the 5 highest values based on question A11a. Thus this 
completely counters the argument that the authors above propose. In fact four of the five 
highest values are from cities in Indonesia.  Does this mean that infact urban areas are 
susceptible to clientelistic practices? Indirectly yes, the 4 other cities are all provincial 
capitals. Potentially this means that clientelistic practices, especially contract allocation, is 
extremely prevalent in provincial capitals.  
Table 4.5: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey”) 
A8a Location 
5,57 Semarang 
5,46 Garut 
5,45 Kota Padang 
5,36 Batang 
5,15 Manggarai Barat 
 
Despite it being a lower number, in the table above there are 2 of the 5 areas which are 
provincial capitals. Question A8a also concerns the hanging out of contracts to political 
supporters. Beneath the top 5, many other provincial capitals took the top spots, such as Kota 
Banda Aceh, the capital of the Aceh province. As a result, there is some consistency that is 
found, in terms of the function of the city and its vulnerability to clientelistic practices. 
Aragon alludes to this phenomenon as well. Despite her text being Sulawesi specific, she 
constantly refers to provincial capitals as a way for agendas to become reality. Furthermore, 
due to decentralization of Indonesia, these provincial capitals have a lot more autonomy. In 
contrast, under Suharto choices were made in Jakarta (Aragon 65). What this means is that 
because of decentralization, provincial capitals have final say over economic decisions. Like 
with Brussels, provincial capitals are places where lobbyists are able to influence legislative 
outcomes, as Aragon discusses in her Sulawesi specific discussion (55). Thus there is great 
interests for many parties to be present and ready to lobby in such cities, especially in cities 
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that represent resource rich provinces. In table 3.4, out of the 4 provincial capitals 2 are 
provincial capitals in areas that are mining intensive, Medan in Aceh and Kota Palangka Raya 
in Central Kalimantan. Thus there is incentive for many individuals to take advantage of the 
economic context. Moreover, Aceh and Central Kalimantan are also known for their other 
natural resources such as gas, coal and timbre. With this in consideration, Aspinall, Hadiz and 
Robinson’s arguments may hold some truth.  Nevertheless, the data demonstrates that such 
behaviour does not directly occur in the resource intensive areas, instead in the locations 
where decisions are made; a similar phenomenon to the legislative assembly described in 
Chapter 2. 
  
Another similarity that is seen with Chapter 2 and 3 is the disproving of certain qualitative 
information. The main impetus for looking at natural resources and its influence on 
clientelism is the breadth at which it is discussed in a multitude of texts. Thus, a great deal of 
data which supported the hypotheses put forth by a multitude of authors was expected. Yet 
what can be concluded is that resources do have a limited influence on clientelism, as it 
incentivizes predatory interests, especially when competing parties work to determine 
legislative outcomes. Yet, overall what this chapter demonstrates is that, where high levels of 
money are invested and are to be made, both in terms of state dependency and resource 
intensiveness, it increases the likelihood for clientelistic enterprises. Therefore, based on the 
statistical analysis chapters 2 to 4, there is only a single factor which yields influence over 
clientelistic behaviour, which is economic characteristics and diversity of particular areas. 
What this entails is that where there is great opportunity to make money, either through 
natural resources or through state funded projects, there is an increased impetus from the 
behalf of political actors and businessmen to partake in clientelistic behaviour. Money making 
opportunities breeds for clientelistic inclinations in Indonesia.  
 
VI. Chapter 5: Consequences of Findings and Survey Discussion  
The “Expert Survey” has demonstrated throughout this thesis that clientelism and vote-buying 
are very widespread in Indonesia. There are certain factors that exacerbate clientelistic 
strategies, however, on the whole, it seems that there is not one area in Indonesia which seems 
to be free of this phenomenon, and throughout the thesis the data confirms the entrenched 
nature of clientelism in Indonesia. But what impact does this have on life in Indonesia?  
 This is a widely discussed topic in today’s literature on Indonesian political life. For 
Edward Aspinall, clientelism has led to the fracturing and loss of polarity in Indonesian 
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Politics. What he states is that fragmentation due to clientelism has resulted in a lack of 
powerful and permanent poles of attraction (Aspinall 2013 35). The fact that there is an 
absence of a strong central state means that now on the local level there is no direction from 
central authority and ministries are constantly fighting for control over patronage networks. 
Political openness today means that more actors can join the clientelistic field, without the 
constrain of Suharto and his party (Aspinall 2013 31). Consequently, politics in Indonesia are 
no longer determined by ideological rational, instead it is a matter of where money can be 
made. This is exemplified by the fact that according to Aspinall, today there is an ease with 
which organizations from starkly differing backgrounds can work together with ease (2013 
36). Based on the claims made by Aspinall, the theme of a weak decentralized state is at the 
roots of clientelistic practices. This is not an isolated opinion. What Hadiz and Robinson 
recommend in order to better the situation in Indonesia, is that “economic and political 
reform… need to be enforced politically and through political struggle” (Hadiz and Robinson 
237). A very similar opinion on betterment is put forth by Syarif Hidayat, where he 
recognizes that re-centralization of power in the hands of central government is a potential 
option according to many academics (224). A central control over political affairs could mean 
that there is an end to the poorly constructed projects, created by project racketeering, 
throughout Indonesia, which is accepted as business as usual (Aragon 53). Such inefficiencies 
are not limited to the construction and infrastructure section. They are found throughout 
Indonesia, where, “the wrong people are recruited, placed, promoted and transferred for the 
wrong reasons” (Blunt et al. 219). This paints a worrying picture of Indonesia, a country far 
removed from meritocratic elements, where it is all about who you know and what you can 
supply that person. Such an image is reflected in our data findings, where on average, people 
claim that 40-60% of major district/city contracts go to businessmen which have supported 
the successful political candidate (Berenschot Expert Survey).  
 Despite the fact that the “Expert Survey” does come into agreement with the 
entrenched nature of clientelism in Indonesia, its weaknesses need to be addressed.  First and 
foremost, this survey is based on perception. Thus it questions local experts on the ground, 
however, it is a matter of perception. The responses given by the interviewees are only based 
on how they view the situation. Nevertheless, in each area, multiple amounts of experts were 
interviewed, from varying political backgrounds, thus their perceptions synthesized to create a 
more neutral outlook on the questions posed. Tied to this is the fact that perception does not 
lead to very accurate answers. For many of the survey’s questions, the possible answers given 
were either, a range of percentages, such as 40-60%, or another form of estimation, such as: 
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likely, very likely and so forth. This results in answers that are perhaps quite removed from 
reality, as even the word likely can differ from person to person based on what they perceive 
is frequent or likely. Another questionable part of the survey is that the interviewees might 
have been scared to give their honest opinion. This is a common problem with all surveys, 
that often people might not bring their full opinion to light. In order to tackle this potential 
problem, Ward Berenschot added a section in his “Expert Survey” where he rated the 
trustworthiness of the interviewee, and only counted the responses given by those deemed 
trustworthy.  
 Despite the negative sides of the survey, there are some things I would like to 
commend Berenschot on. He carried out parts of his survey in Indonesia, however, he 
delegated his tasks to other people such as professors throughout Indonesia. These people 
were known in their respective regions and were therefore able to carry out the survey to 
maximum efficiency and create increased reliability of the responses. I would also like to take 
this opportunity to thank Ward Berenschot to share his work with me. Through his efforts I 
was able to compare and contrast qualitative and quantitative work done on clientelism in 
Indonesia, and create my own conclusions from the two sets of sources. His incredible efforts 
to culminate a wide range of answers on the polemic of vote-buying and clientelism in 
Indonesia provide a very well rounded and global perspective on how different regions vary 
or not in their clientelistic practices, and provide a great background in order to determine 
what influences clientelistic practices.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
As mentioned several times in this thesis, the combination of primary sources, constituting the 
“Expert Survey” and the “District Statistics” along-side the secondary sources, allowed for 
the confirmation or negation of certain hypotheses. This thesis provides for a well-rounded 
argumentation on what constitutes clientelism, what its driving forces are in Indonesia and 
what the impacts are of such practices. By looking at three potential determinants of 
clientelism, this thesis was able to confirm some of those perceived determinants and create 
alternate hypotheses for other determinants.  
 The main aim of this thesis was to discover the source of clientelism in Indonesia 
based on three prominent factors from the literature. The first of these factors was to look at 
urban and rural divisions and whether such cleavages were integral to clientelistic behaviour. 
What was seen in Chapter 2 was that these cleavages played no role in the level of perceived 
clientelism. Instead what was concluded was that Indonesia has largely held on to informal 
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and more traditional forms of societal and political organization, as has been claimed by 
Scott. Consequently, political actors active in cities or in the country side do not adapt their 
behaviour, due to the pervasiveness of clientelistic behaviour in this respect. Seeing as there 
was a lack of conclusions that could be drawn from urban and rural divides, the next division 
that was to look at whether poverty-a topic much discussed in literature on clientelism-had 
any effect on the political behaviour of people in Indonesia. Once more, the statistical results 
were that in Indonesia poverty plays no role in the presence of clientelism in Indonesia. 
Therefore, this could was discarded as a possible source of clientelism. Lastly, the remaining 
factor of clientelism which was noted in literature was economic activity. The results that 
were found was that non-diversified economies, especially state dependent economies are 
likely to suffer from clientelistic practices, due to a monopolization of economic and political 
practice conventions by few actors, as demonstrated through the tragedy of the commons 
idea. Therefore, what can be said is that it is not a matter of urban or rural distinctions which 
exacerbates traditional political ties, nor is it poverty which inclines people to partake in 
political clientelism. Instead it can effectively be said that the main driver for clientelism and 
vote-buying is found in centres where large sums of money and profits are up for contention.  
 I believe that this thesis successfully analyses the different urban and rural divisions 
and whether there are certain aspects which tend to influence clientelism more. Seeing as I 
had statistical data at my disposal, this gave me more liberty in determining what the actual 
contributors to clientelism are in Indonesia. The short-comes of this thesis were that there was 
a plethora of data available and thus endless graphs could be constructed in order to arrive at a 
conclusion. But the scope of my thesis did not allow for me to discuss every determinant of 
clientelism in great detail. An important area in where this topic could be expanded, is in 
creating more concrete reasons as to why Indonesia does not embody large sociological 
divisions in clientelism, especially in the realms of urban and rural and why poverty does not 
cast such great influence over clientelism as is with other countries. On the whole, given my 
scope, I believe that I provided plausible reasons to explain certain divisions in clientelistic 
practices in Indonesia, yet there is room to expand on these further. 
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